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Abstract 
 
The measurement of performance in the public sector has become 
increasingly important in recent years and it is now commonplace for transport 
organisations, and local and national governments, to publish performance 
goals for service supply and quality. Such commitments, when time 
referenced, are known as targets. This paper explain how changes in 
management style, consumer rights legislation, contractual obligations and 
other factors have combined to make management-by targets increasingly 
common in the public sector. The advantages and disadvantages of 
management-by-targets are illustrated through discussion of the processes 
and experience of setting transport targets in UK national transport policy. We 
conclude that while some of the targets have had a significant impact on 
policy makers, managers and their agents, the effects have not always been 
as intended. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The use of targets to assess the performance of, and report on, different 
aspects of government is becoming increasingly widespread within the public 
sector (NAO, 2001). The transport sector has, for the most part, followed 
rather than led in these changes. However, the assessment of transport 
system performance through targets is becoming increasingly widespread 
worldwide (FHWA, 2004; NCHRP, 2004; TIPP, 2004; Hidas and Black, 2002; 
Turner et al., 1999). Despite these trends there is little published evidence on 
the effect of targets on the performance of the transport sector.  
 
This paper explores the motivations for target setting, reviews the processes 
that can be adopted in setting targets and, with particular reference to the 
targets incorporated in the UK Government’s Ten Year Plan for Transport 
(DETR, 2000a), seeks to draw conclusions on the impact of targets on policy 
making and implementation.  Although this paper concentrates on UK case 
studies we believe that the principles behind the conclusions drawn are 
universal and should be of wider interest.  
 
Given the difficulties caused by ambiguous terminology in this field, we think it 
appropriate to begin by defining the terminology adopted in this paper (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Terminology 
Term Definition 
Objective A succinct statement of the key goal(s) being pursued over the 
medium to long-term. May be expressed in terms of an input (q.v.) 
(e.g. “to invest in road safety”), an output (q.v.) (e.g. “to increase 
the provision of pedestrian crossings”) or an outcome (q.v.) (e.g. 
“to improve safety for all travellers”) 
Input(s) The resources that contribute to the production and delivery of an 
output. (e.g. research, capital investment, running costs) 
Process  The means by which an outcome or output is to be achieved (e.g. 
by adopting an integrated approach to transport planning) 
Output(s) The immediate result of an action (e.g. numbers of new-style 
pedestrian crossings introduced) 
Outcome(s) The ultimate impacts of an action (e.g. reduced number of road 
casualties) 
Performance 
indicator 
A means of measuring performance (e.g. number of fatalities per 
thousand vehicle kilometres per annum) 
Constraint A limit on inputs or processes or a level of performance that an 
organisation feels it must achieve. 
Target The level of performance that the organization aims to achieve for a 
particular activity within a given timeframe. Usually relates back to 
an objective and may be expressed in terms of inputs (e.g. 
investment of 1bn Euro in road safety during 2003), outputs (e.g. 
construct 1000 new-style pedestrian crossings in 2004), or 
outcomes (e.g. reduce the  number of fatalities by 5% per year 
between 2003 and 2010) 
Source: loosely adapted from NAO (2001) 
 
2. Motivations for the Use of Targets 
 
The increasing use of targets reflects changes in management philosophy, in 
government’s view of its role and responsibilities and more general changes 
in society. Five principal motivations for the use of targets are suggested 
below. 
 
2.1 Better management 
 
The use of performance targets is widespread in the private sector where they 
are an integral part of the dominant management philosophy (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Gates, 2001). Performance 
measurement systems have been studied, particularly in the field of 
operational research, for many years (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1992). It is 
generally held that target-based performance management is essential to 
success in a commercial environment. A recent review (2GC, 2003, p2) 
concluded that “without target values, the utility of a performance 
management system is massively reduced”, and a survey of 113 major 
companies across the world (Gates, 2001, p1) found that “Measurement-
managed companies consistently out-perform companies that do not use 
measures to manage”. 
 
Targets can be set by organisations for a variety of management purposes: to 
communicate the strategic choices taken; to define benchmark best practice 
activity levels or to set desired goals for attitudinal or cultural change (2GC, 
2003). Management-by-targets suggests that, when given a clear goal, 
management and workers can be encouraged to focus their attention on the 
essentials to success and, by monitoring achievement of the target, can be 
motivated to succeed. Many organisations now make an explicit link between 
their employees’ salary and achievement of targets by means of performance-
related payments or bonuses. 
 
The effectiveness of targets in stimulating focussed achievement 
presupposes that the targets are ‘SMART’ (Specific, Measurable, Achievable 
but challenging, Relevant to the organisation, and Time bound), that the 
process of measuring outcomes and performance against targets is fully 
integrated into the business planning cycle and that they cover all significant 
areas of work (Commonwealth of Australia, 1996; HM Treasury et al., 2001). 
We examine the robustness of this assumption in the transport sector through 
the case studies in Section 4. 
 
Performance measurement has found increased application within 
government partly because of the perception that government should conduct 
its business in a more disciplined, business-like, environment than was 
previously the case. Government can use targets to focus the minds of civil 
servants and to exercise control over agents and subsidiary authorities. 
Where continued funding is made dependent on the achievement of targets, 
this control over agents and subsidiary authorities can be given particular 
potency. Their use in the public sector also reflects the political, legal and 
consumer-oriented landscape in which public policy is made and enacted - as 
discussed below. 
 
 
2.2 Legal and contractual obligations 
 
Perhaps the most powerful motivation for organisations to develop targets, 
whether in the public or private sector, is the existence of legal or contractual 
obligations that give particular importance to the achievement of a given level 
of performance. These obligations may have been freely entered into, as is 
the case when a supplier negotiates to provide a guaranteed level of service 
to its client, or may be established in law.  
 
In the transport context, performance targets related to punctuality and 
reliability, which will have been negotiated between the state and the transport 
providers as part of a service contract, can be regarded as contracts freely 
entered into. Other transport targets driven by legal requirements include 
environmental targets such as air quality or noise standards set by European 
and national administrations (e.g. DETR et al., 2000). 
 
The existence of legal and contractual obligations, and the possibility of 
compensation claims, provides a clear stimulus to service providers to set, 
monitor and achieve targets which are no less stringent than those embodied 
in the legal obligation. Where the penalty for not meeting a legal obligation is 
significant in financial, moral or political terms, an organisation might regard 
meeting that obligation as a constraint rather than as a target (see definitions 
in Table 1).  
 
2.3 Resource constraints 
 
The provision of public services is constrained by the availability of money, 
materials, manpower and knowledge.  Management theory suggests that, by 
using targets to focus on measurable achievements, efficiency in the use of 
resources is likely to be increased but, where the resources are strictly limited, 
reliance on indicators of output or outcomes will put pressure on the resource 
constraints. This may result in the targets not being met or in the constraints 
being broken – it being a political judgement as to which of these is the least 
damaging. An even more unsatisfactory situation can arise if targets are 
expressed purely in terms of inputs (e.g. “we will invest x million Euros in new 
buses”) because there is no incentive to ensure that the money is spent 
effectively and, since the target can be achieved most easily by increasing 
expenditure, resources are likely to be wasted.  
 
An alternative approach is to set targets for outputs or outcomes which reflect 
the resource constraints. Setting the actual target level will require the kind of 
careful costing, analysis and planning which one might regard as the hallmark 
of a well-run organisation in the public or private sector. Of course, if 
circumstances change and the planning assumptions prove to have been 
inaccurate, the target may become unachievable. It is clear that consideration 
of resource constraints has particular relevance for the determination of the 
ambitiousness of the targets set within the performance management 
process. This is discussed further in Section 5. 
 
2.4 Consumer orientation  
 
User satisfaction with public services is of primary concern to an elected 
government. In their analysis of the principles of government Hjortdal and 
Schou (1994) argued that increased dialogue between public agencies and 
citizens was becoming an important new principle of organisation throughout 
the public sector. These concerns have been addressed primarily through the 
development of consumers’ (or citizens’) charters and through the publication 
of targets. The preamble to the Portuguese Charter is explicit in stating that 
“The customer is the judge of quality, the citizen-customer is the focus of 
attention for the public services” (SMA, 1995). The UK Government accepts 
that target setting should “include systematic monitoring of user satisfaction 
with public services” (HoC, 2003).  
 
This dialogue requires government to know what the public want. Traditional 
political intuition is now supplemented by focus groups and surveys which 
seek people’s views on the current state of public services and their support 
for potential policy interventions. Correctly undertaken, satisfaction surveys 
can identify key issues in the provision of public services, quantify and track 
changes in the target group’s satisfaction with the services provided and can 
identify the emergence of new problems. They can thus provide a basis for 
the definition of targets and for monitoring their achievement. However, recent 
research (Marsden and Kelly, 2005) has suggested that indicators of user 
satisfaction are poorly represented in the UK transport planning process. 
Other research has highlighted that, without careful questionnaire design, 
sampling and re-weighting, the results of such surveys can give a very biased 
picture of the public’s concerns and aspirations (Bonsall et al., 2005). 
 
2.5 Political aspirations  
 
The political dimension to target-setting in the public sector is inescapable. 
Targets are a means by which politicians communicate policies to the 
electorate and differentiate themselves from their opponents – even at the risk 
of making it easier for opponents to point to any failures which subsequently 
occur. The use of targets in the public sector is not therefore a new 
phenomenon. The desire to set ambitious targets as a basis for election while 
avoiding a too public commitment to something which may prove 
unachievable creates obvious tensions. 
 
The role of targets as indicators of political aspirations is inextricably linked to 
the question of political accountability in a democracy. Kelly and Snell (2005) 
reviewed developments of the use of information to achieve accountability 
within the UK parliamentary system and conclude that, whereas in the 100 
years leading up to the second world war, the emphasis was simply on the 
accounting of inputs, post second world war the substantial increase in 
government expenditure led to debates about the size and complexity of the 
machinery of government and to “a perceived lack of control and 
accountability” (Ibid., p9). Carter et al. (1992) hypothesised that increased 
emphasis on reporting was due to three main concerns: about public 
expenditure planning; about managerial competence within the Civil Service; 
and about accountability. Kelly and Snell (2005) note the significance of a 
1972 decision by the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons who 
decided that, in order to measure achievements against targets, emphasis 
should be placed on monitoring output indicators for individual service 
departments. As Carter et al. (1992: p7) put it  ‘for centuries parliament had 
fought to establish its right to examine…proposals for spending now it was 
fighting for its right to examine what the money actually bought’.  Targets in 
the transport sector have traditionally focused on the output of road or 
motorway construction (e.g. DoT, 1989) but, as we shall see, there is now a 
strong drive to relate targets to the core outcomes implied by the main 
objectives of each government or local authority department. 
 
3. Approaches to Setting Targets 
 
This section focuses on the practicalities of target setting, accepting that the 
targets themselves may be motivated by one or more of the reasons outlined 
above. We identify three main approaches to target setting, two are evidence-
led, the third aspirational. This section uses case studies to indicate how they 
have been used in the UK transport sector. 
 
3.1 Model-based 
The first, and most rigorous method of setting targets, is to apply models of 
transport user and system interaction to examine how a given indicator varies 
under a range of different policy scenarios. This enables a realistic range of 
responses to be identified to provide the evidence base for picking a target. 
The success of such an approach relies on three factors: 
x the ability of the model to reflect reality; 
x the accuracy with which assumptions are made about how underlying 
exogenous factors will change over the period for which the target is 
being set; and 
x the extent to which the policy interventions assumed to be in place are 
indeed implemented. 
The first two aspects are an accepted feature of any modelling procedure. 
The third involves engineering and political judgement and is at the heart of 
determining the level for the target; ambitious assumptions about policy 
implementation will suggest scope for ambitious targets. 
 
Some of the targets in the UK government’s Ten Year Plan for Transport 
(10YP) (DETR, 2000a) were developed following a modelling exercise and, to 
assist with the transparency of the process of target setting, the government 
published the underlying assumptions and modelled outcomes around which 
the Plan was based (DETR, 2000b). Assumptions about the rate of economic 
growth, population change, household growth and household composition 
were consistent with forecasts from other Government departments. A further 
key assumption was that the underlying price of oil per barrel would fall from 
$28 in 2000 to $16 per barrel in 2010. In fact the rate of economic growth has 
been higher, and the price of oil much higher, than was expected. 
 
To counter uncertainty about assumptions and policy implementation four 
alternative scenarios were run in addition to the core 10YP scenario, reported 
on in DETR (2000b): 
1. Constant (instead of falling) motoring costs and additional investment 
2. Wider take-up of local charging powers (80 cities outside London adopt 
local charging schemes (compared to 20 in the core scenario). 
3. Road charging on the most congested parts of the interurban network 
to a maximum on 10 pence per kilometre. 
4. All three scenarios combined. 
 
Table 2 shows the range of outcomes forecast for the do-minimum, the 10YP 
and for each of the four scenarios. The table also shows the targets which 
were adopted. A discussion on the full list of targets adopted in the 10YP is 
included in Section 4. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: DfT model forecasts and targets for 2010 (as at 2000) 
 
% change on year 2000 levels 
Scenarios – 10YP plus:  
  
Indicator 
 
 
 
2010 
Baseline 
(do 
minimum) 
     
2010 
 
10YP 
 
1 
constant 
motoring 
costs 
2 
wider 
local 
charging 
3 
inter-
urban 
charging 
Scenarios 
1, 2 and 3 
combined 
Target 
set for 
2010 
 
Traffic kms 22 17 13 17 17 12 none 
Congestion 
(all roads) 15 -6 -12 -7 -9 -15 none 
Congestion on 
trunk-roads 28 -5 -11 -5 -20 -25 <0 
Congestion in 
large urban 
areas 15 -8 -11 -8 -12 -15 <0 
CO2 2.3 -2.9 -5.5 -2.9 -3.2 -6.5 None* 
NOx -57.5 -58.5 -58.9  -58.5 -58.7 -59.4 None 
PM10 -45.3 -45.3 -46.8 -45.8 -46.3 -47.3 None 
Rail passenger 
kms 23 51 83 n/a** n/a** n/a** 50% 
* No specific transport target was agreed although reference was made to the UK 
national commitment to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels. 
** No forecast made 
 
The targets set for congestion were for major urban areas and the inter-urban 
network as these were viewed as having the most severe problems. The 
model suggested that the targets were achievable under a range of 
circumstances. The target of a 50% growth in rail patronage was more 
stretching as it was dependent on capacity increases that would otherwise 
constrain growth and only allowed a 1% dip from projected patronage 
increases. 
 
 
3.2 Extrapolation and evidence-led judgement 
 
Not all indicators can be modelled, or modelled with sufficient accuracy for 
target setting. Equally, not all authorities can afford to develop and maintain 
transport models for their networks. Where such a situation arises the next 
most logical approach is to use extrapolation and professional judgement. 
Extrapolation is only possible if there exists a sufficiently long time-series of 
data, and even then it is important to identify random fluctuations and 
separate long-term trends from effects such as major policy interventions.  
The trend line can be used to estimate a baseline position and the potential 
impact of policy interventions can then be superimposed. Techniques such as 
benchmarking (Gilmour and Seagriff, 2004) and the use of data from 
knowledge bases such as KonSULT1 or the TDM Encyclopaedia2 and good 
practice guides (e.g. Cairns et al., 2004) can be used to estimate the potential 
                                            
1
 http://www.elseviersocialsciences.com/transport/konsult/index.html 
2
 http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/ 
impact of a range of policy interventions in a less formalised manner than 
would normally be the case with a traditional model. 
 
Extrapolation and expert judgement is widely used to set targets for road 
traffic accidents. This reflects the general availability of excellent time series 
data on the occurrence of accidents and of substantial evidence on the extent 
to which policy interventions (such as accident blackspot treatment, speed 
cameras and vehicle technology improvements) might lead to reductions in 
accidents. The 1987 Strategy for Road Safety (DoT, 1987) was the first major 
example of outcome based target setting in UK transport. It set a target for a 
33% reduction in casualties by 2000. The success of this target is reviewed in 
Section 4.2.  
 
3.3 Aspirational 
 
The third approach to target setting is based on aspiration. Aspirational 
targets differ from extrapolation and evidence-led judgement in that, although 
time-series data may be available, no strong evidence base exists on the 
likely behavioural response to changes in policy and investment. The targets 
set therefore reflect a best assessment of what should be achieved.  
 
The development of the UK’s national cycling targets provides an interesting 
illustration of this. The 1996 National Cycling Strategy (DoT, 1996) contained 
a target of doubling cycle use between 1996 and 2002 (and quadrupling it by 
2012). The strategy was intended to create “a focus for organisations and 
individuals who are in a position to influence a change in physical conditions, 
the attitudes of individuals and the outlook of organisations.” (Ibid., p5) The 
targets were set against a background of a steady decline in cycle use and 
were, from the outset, regarded by outside observers as somewhat ambitious. 
The Strategy document made oblique reference to this with the words; “For 
some organisations the prospect of doubling bicycle use may be a relatively 
straightforward commitment - for others it may appear to be an impossibility. It 
is hoped that all will establish challenging yet achievable targets, the 
cumulative result of which will realise the national aspiration”. (Ibid., p16). 
 
 
4. Recent Experience in the UK 
 
Section 3 provided a review of three different approaches to setting targets 
within transport. Use of an appropriate approach will help to ensure that the 
target is achievable but, as the SMART framework implies, it must also be 
specific, measurable, relevant and time-bound. With these desiderata in mind, 
this section will review the UK experience with a series of transport targets 
over the past two decades. The first part focuses on national targets set within 
the 10YP and is organised according to the methodological approach 
introduced in Section 3. The second part indicates how these national targets 
have fed down to the local level. 
 
Table 3 lists the targets set in the 10YP in 2000, indicates how they had 
evolved between 2000 and 2004 and records their status following a major 
review in July 2004 (DfT, 2004). 
 
4.1 Model-based target experience 
 
Section 3.1 described the apparently rigorous approach to the development of 
the congestion and rail targets in the 10YP. However, by mid-2002, only 12 
months into the actual 10 Year Plan period, the credibility of the congestion 
and rail targets were being widely questioned (HoC, 2002).  
 
On roads, it quickly became apparent that very few local authorities would 
introduce local charging (the 10YP had assumed that 20 would do so but, to 
date, only London and, in a very modest scheme, Durham, have gone ahead). 
At the same time, concerns were raised about the speed with which the 
anticipated roads programme would be completed (HoC, 2002) and the 
achievability of the targets was being widely questioned. Interestingly, none of 
the examined scenarios had assumed less than full implementation of the 
interventions envisaged in the 10YP.  
 
The relevance of the chosen indicator of congestion was also being 
challenged. Goodwin (CPRE, 2001) highlighted its sensitivity to relatively 
small changes in actual journey times; he showed that small time savings 
could result in large reductions in the indicator’s value and that relatively 
modest increases in journey times (due, for example, to policy implementation 
falling behind schedule) would produce massive increases in the indicator’s 
value – neither of which outcomes particularly reflects the public’s own 
experience of traffic conditions which, as was highlighted in Section 2, should 
be an important consideration.  
 
As with the roads target, both the metric and the achievability of the rail target 
was criticised. The Passenger Transport Executive Group criticised the use of 
passenger kms as an indicator because it favoured the development of long-
distance cross-country routes and London commuter services rather than the 
local commuting services that are important to the transport systems of other 
major cities (PTEG, 2002). More significant however was the serious rail 
accident in October 2000, just three months after the 10YP was published, 
when a high speed train left the tracks as a result of a broken rail causing 
several fatalities.  Subsequent investigation revealed that the rail network was 
in a worse state of repair than had previously been thought and widespread 
speed restrictions were introduced on safety grounds – causing a 
deterioration in service reliability. It soon became apparent that the substantial 
rail expenditure which had been provided for under the 10YP would be 
swallowed in maintenance and that only a relatively limited expansion 
programme would be possible. These factors combined to interrupt progress 
towards the rail patronage target. The actual increases in rail patronage are 
shown in Figure 1 as are the do-minimum and 10YP target values. It is clear 
that performance is currently following the ‘do-minimum’ line and that the 
10YP line is proving to be over optimistic. 
Table 3: Evolution of Ten Year Plan Targets 
 
Original Target (as in 2000) Status pre July 2004 announcement July 2004 statement/revised 
target (DfT, 2004) 
1 Reduce congestion on the inter-urban trunk road network 
and in large urban areas in England below 2000 levels by 
2010 
No definition for congestion had yet been agreed (see 
Section 4.1) 
The Department is developing better indicators 
of inter-urban and urban congestion and will 
publish new targets by July 2005 
2 Increase rail use in Great Britain (measured in passenger 
kilometres) from 2000 levels by 50% by 20101, with 
investment in infrastructure and capacity, while at the 
same time securing improvements in rail punctuality and 
reliability2  
Government had conceded that the extra capacity 
needed to allow a 50% growth in rail use is unaffordable 
(see Section 4.2) 
The rail patronage target has been abandoned. 
The new rail target is to improve punctuality 
and reliability of rail services to at least 85% by 
2006 with further improvements  by 2008 
3 Increase bus use in England (measured by the number of 
passenger journeys) from 2000 levels by 10% by 20101, 
while at the same time securing improvements in 
punctuality and reliability.2 
On track due almost entirely to substantial increases in 
bus use in London which represents around 1/3 of the 
UK bus market (see Section 4.2) 
4 Double light rail use in England (measured by the number 
of passenger journeys) by 2010 from 2000 levels 
 
Increased tender prices had recently led to the 
suspension of many proposed schemes (see Section 
4.2) 
The new target is to increase the use of public 
transport (bus and light rail) by more than 12 
per cent in England by 2010 compared with 
2000 levels, with growth in every region 
5 Cut journey times on London Underground services by 
increasing capacity and reducing delays (specific targets 
were to be agreed by Mayor after the Public Private 
Partnership had been established) 
The PPP deals were concluded during 2003 and the 
underground had become the responsibility of the 
Mayor. A whole suite of performance related targets 
were embodied in the PPP contracts but this is now 
seen as a matter of London governance. Performance 
against benchmarks had been mixed (NAO, 2004) 
There is now no national target relating to the 
London Underground 
6 Reduce the number of people killed and seriously injured 
in Great Britain in road accidents by 40%, and the number 
On track across all categories of casualty (see Section 
4.2 and DfT (2003a) 
The target has been augmented by adding, 
tackling the significantly higher incidence in 
of children killed or seriously injured by 50% by 2010 
compared with the average for 1994-98 
disadvantaged communities. 
7 Improve Air Quality by meeting our National Air Quality 
Strategy objectives for carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen 
dioxide, particles, sulphur, benzene and 1-3 butadiene. 
Joint target with DEFRA 
 
On track for all seven  pollutants except NOx and PM10 
(but these too were on a downward trend (DfT, 2003a)) 
Unchanged 
8 It ought to be possible to achieve an 80% increase in rail 
freight by 2010 
Rail freight had increased by 10% in the first year of the 
plan but suffered through disruptions to the Channel 
Tunnel rail link. Insufficient funds were available to 
support the necessary freight infrastructure upgrading 
and there was a shortage of inter-modal interchanges 
Target  abandoned 
9 Triple the number of cycling trips compared with a 2000 
base, by 2010 
 
A halt in the decline of cycling had been achieved (See 
Section 4.3) 
Target abandoned to be replaced by a general 
aim, supported by as yet unspecified local 
targets, to increase walking and cycling in 
the next 20 to 30 years” 
10 Achieve a 1/3 increase in the proportion of households in 
rural areas within 10 minutes walk of an hourly or better 
bus service by 2010 
Substantial increases had been reported  Local targets for bus service provision now 
encouraged 
11 By June 2001, no more than 0.5% of bus services 
cancelled for reasons within operators control 
Not on target - 1.6 % of services cancelled in 2002/03 
compared to 1.8% in 2000/01. Failure was related to a 
number of factors including labour market conditions 
Incorporated into the new combined public 
transport target 
12 Bring down the average age of buses to 8 years by 2001 This target had been met (DfT, 2003a) and a 
commitment had been given by bus operators to 
maintain this 
There is a new target relating to low floor or 
accessible buses.   
13 Reduce rail overcrowding to meet SRA standards Rail overcrowding standards continued to be breached 
and there seemed little prospect of solving commuter 
overcrowding on the London network 
Target abandoned 
14 Maintain our strategic road network in optimum conditions 
 
This target was being met. The target is now specific to the Highways 
Agency 
15 Provide sufficient resources to local authorities to halt the 
deterioration in the condition of local roads by 2004 and to 
eliminate the backlog by 2010. 
The condition of unclassified local roads had continued 
to deteriorate although the backlog in other roads had 
been halted in line with the first target. There was 
considerable on-going debate about the true size of the 
maintenance backlog. 
Target abandoned to be replaced by local 
targets 
16 Invest £121 billion of public money by 2010 Extra resources had been pledged above the £121m 
already committed but less private finance had become 
available than was originally anticipated. Rail costs had 
risen significantly so it was unclear whether spend was 
rising in real terms 
Not officially a target but the new total remains 
a clearly defined statement of investment intent 
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Figure 1: Changes in national rail patronage compared to year 2000 
estimates 
 
By mid 2002 it was becoming politically difficult to support the targets set in 
2000 and, shortly after the introduction of a new Secretary of State for 
Transport in late 2002, the Department for Transport produced a revised 
version of the modelling underpinning the 10 Year Plan. It noted that whereas 
the modelling underpinning the 10YP had consisted of “separate models for 
road and rail traffic, combined with forecasts from other models” the revised 
model was fully multi-modal and contained some feedback between different 
parts of the model (DfT, 2003b, p4). The approach also differed with respect 
to the sensitivity tests. The initial 10YP modelling examined a series of 
scenarios which all gave more positive outcomes than the Plan itself whilst 
the revised modelling approach reported results in a range according to 
different input assumptions “taking into account uncertainty over future 
behaviour and the impact of policies” (Ibid., p2). The baseline assumptions 
were revisited in the light of, for example, higher forecasts of economic growth 
than had seemed likely in 2000. The results were based on a series of 
assumptions for a low and high demand scenario that would fall either side of 
the baseline. Economic growth was varied r2% and a range of assumptions 
were made about propensity to travel and responses to so called ‘soft 
measures’ (Ibid., p13).  
 
Table 4 shows the results from the new (2002) model runs alongside 
forecasts and targets dating from 20003. It is clear that, even if all the 10YP 
                                            
3
 The presence of a substantially enhanced model structure with slightly different baseline 
assumptions makes direct comparison of results with the year 2000 estimates non exact. In 
addition London results have been merged with those for other large urban areas. 
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policy options were to be introduced by 2010, the original (2000) targets for 
congestion on trunk roads, for congestion in urban areas and for rail 
patronage look unlikely to be met by 2010. 
 
Table 4: DfT Model forecasts for 2010; forecasts made in 2002 compared 
with those from 2000  
 
% change on 2000 levels 
2010 Baseline (do minimum) levels 2010 10YP Scenario 
Estimated in 2002 
Forecast in  2002  
           Indicator 
 
 
 
Estimated 
in 2000 
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Forecast 
in 2000 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Target  
for 
2010 
(as at 
2000) 
Traffic kms 22 23 26 17 20 25 none 
Congestion (all roads) 15 27 32 -6 11 20 none 
Congestion on trunk-roads 28 52 67 -5 1 15 <0 
Congestion in London and large 
urban areas 15 25 30 -8 9 20 <0 
CO2 (MtC) 2.3 2.9 4.5 -2.9 -1.9 1 none 
Nox (Kt) -57.5 -47.7 -46.9 -58.5 -48.1 -46.9 none 
PM10 (Kt) -45.3 -41 -40.4 -45.3 -40.8 -39.9 none  
Rail passenger kms 23 18 30 51 33 49 50% 
 
The use, in 2000, of a model based approach to help set the 10YP targets 
clearly did not guarantee that the targets would be realistic. Deficiencies in the 
model and the use of assumptions which turned out to be wrong resulted in 
forecasts which supported targets which proved overly ambitious. Of course, 
the fact that there are ‘technical’ reasons for the over-ambitiousness of the 
targets counts for little in the political and media debate on the extent to which 
targets are being met. However, the modelling has provided a reasoned basis 
for proposing alterations to strategy in the light of unforeseen circumstances. 
It has for example drawn attention to the need for more radical policy 
interventions to tackle congestion (e.g. Darling, 2005).  
 
4.2 Extrapolation and evidence-led judgement based target experience 
 
Evidence on this type of target comes from the safety targets of 1987 and 
2000 and from the public transport targets set out in the 10YP. In 1987, a 
target for a 33% reduction in casualties by 2000 relative to the 1981-85 
average was set. This target, and the figures for actual casualty numbers are 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Strictly speaking, the 1987 strategy failed in that the total number of road 
casualties fell by only 1% during the specified period compared to a target 
reduction of 33%. In fact, since traffic levels grew by 55% during the same 
period, it is likely that the 1987 target was never realistically achievable. 
However, despite this growth in traffic, Killed and Seriously injured (KSI) fell 
by 41% (DETR, 2000c see Figure 2), and it has been argued that the 
existence of the target had a very positive effect, particularly in providing an 
impetus for education campaigns, vehicle design improvement negotiations 
and some engineering improvements. 
 15
 0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
Year
A
ll 
Ca
su
la
tie
s 
(th
ou
sa
n
ds
)
All casualties actual
Road Safety Strategy 33% reduction target
KSI actual
96
84
72
60
48
36
24
12
0
K
S
I 
(t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
)
 
Figure 2: Changes in total casualties and KSI relative to 1987 Road 
Safety Strategy target 
 
The 10YP also specified road safety targets and, as in the case of the 1987 
strategy, they were again developed in the light of a combination of 
extrapolation and expert judgement. Learning perhaps from the problems 
experienced with having a target expressed only in terms of total casualties, 
the 10YP targets were expressed in terms of numbers of people killed or 
seriously injured (KSI) (the actual targets being a 40% reduction in total KSI 
and a 50% reduction in child KSI by 2010 compared to the respective 1994-98 
averages). A target was also set for a 10% reduction in the slight casualty rate 
- thereby allowing for any changes to total vehicle kilometres travelled. 
 
Figure 3 shows the target and actual total KSI and the target and actual slight 
casualty rate.  
 
Other targets set on the basis of extrapolation and judgement include the 
10YP targets for bus use (increase passenger journeys by 10%) and light rail 
use (double passenger journeys). The bus use target is on track to being met, 
largely due to substantial increases in bus patronage in London whilst decline 
continues across large parts of the rest of the UK, albeit at a much slower rate 
than in the preceding 10 year period. The 10YP assumed up to 25 new Light 
Rail lines would be constructed. In the light of recent increases in tender costs 
and an unwillingness from central and local government to cover provide the 
funding to cover these price rises, fewer light rail schemes will be built than 
had been anticipated and the Light Rail target seems unlikely to be met.   
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Figure 3: Changes in KSI and slight casualty rate 1981-2003 and targets   
Irrespective of whether or not the 10YP targets for bus and light rail patronage 
are met, they, like the target for heavy rail, can be criticised as referring to 
solutions rather than outcomes; the adoption of separate targets for each 
mode suggests that a particular mix of modes is appropriate and so limits the 
scope for rational analysis of their relative merits in any given situation. 
Interestingly, the bus and light rail patronage targets have since been 
combined and this will allow a more even handed approach to determining 
where resources should be allocated – although the exclusion of local rail 
from the equation still leaves something of a distortion. On a broader level, 
however, the existence of any target for public transport patronage may be 
questionned; although increased use of public transport is clearly related to 
the government’s objectives to improve the environment, increase equity and 
increase economic efficiency, these links are, at best,  indirect. Increased use 
of public transport will not yield environmental improvement unless it results in 
reduced car use, will not increase equity if only the richest people can afford 
to travel by car, and will not bring economic efficiency if journey times or costs 
are thereby increased. The recently  announced intention to provide free 
travel for all senior citizens in England will, for example, contribute to 
improved equity (at a price to the exchequer) but could substantially bolster 
bus usage without impacting peak-hour mode split. One value of patronage 
targets is that they provide a statement of intent from the government 
regarding its support for public transport and a common agenda for local 
policy makers and bus companies. Their danger lies in the risk that achieving 
the increased patronage becomes the focus of policy rather than part of a 
strategy to tackle the real issues (congestion, air quality, noise, climate 
change emissions etc). 
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4.3 Aspiration-led target experience 
 
The experience of the aspiration-led national cycling target for the UK has 
been disappointing. As can be seen from Figure 4, progress between 1996 
and 2000 fell well short of the National Cycling Strategy targets. Nevertheless, 
the 10YP included an almost equally ambitious target to triple cycle use 
between 2000 and 2010. This has been interpreted by some observers as a 
political unwillingness to change what was a manifestly unachievable target. 
By 2004 it was obvious that the revised target was not going top be met and, 
in the July 2004 announcement, the national target has been abandoned and 
replaced by an aspiration, backed by as yet unspecified local targets, to 
increase the amount of cycling and walking over the next twenty to thirty years 
(DfT, 2004a). 
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Figure 4: Cycling Volumes and Targets 
  
Even if it is accepted that cycling should be encouraged as a sustainable 
mode which promotes health, the rationale for selecting such ambitious 
targets was always open to question. The existence of a cycling target might, 
as in the case of the safety targets, have been set in order to galvanise all 
parties to improve cycling conditions. If so, the targets may be said to have 
succeeded in as much as actions were taken and funds were invested, but 
whether the actions were insufficient or the premise that such actions would 
encourage more cycling was false, the failure to make any progress towards 
the targets caused question marks have been raised over the whole cycling 
strategy.  
 
The National Cycling Strategy and 10YP targets for increased cycling were 
apparently set without reference to model based forecasts of the possible 
effectiveness of the policy interventions which were designed to deliver the 
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increase, and clearly assumed that long term trends could be altered. This 
may be a salutary lesson in the dangers of aspirational targets. Interestingly, 
the latest National Transport Model includes tentative predictions of the 
impacts of National Cycling Strategy on cycling volumes. The 2003 analysis 
suggests an increase in cycle use of between 30% and 37% by 2010 with the 
10YP in place and a small decline in its absence (DfT, 2003b). It is interesting 
to speculate on whether, had these forecasts been available in 1996 or in 
2000, the National Cycling Strategy and 10YP targets for cycling would have 
been so ambitious.  
 
4.4 Targets at a local level 
 
Under the terms of the government’s Spending Review for the period 199-
2002 all central government departments were required to set targets in 1998 
(Brown, 1998). By 2000 this had filtered down to local transport planning. 
Local authorities in England were asked to submit five year integrated 
transport strategies (Local Transport Plans) to national government setting out 
what they wanted to achieve and how much capital funding would be required 
to deliver it (Marsden and Wootton, 2001). As part of this process, authorities 
were required to set targets for key indicators and to assess and report 
annually on progress against these targets. There was little experience of 
such an approach to strategy management among local authorities and this 
some of them to choose to report on up to 100 indicators. A review of the 
implementation of the Local Transport Plan process found that most 
authorities had provided a clear set of targets but that there was little evidence 
that they were “realistic and challenging” (Atkins, 2003, p14). The same study 
also reported that many authorities felt that too much emphasis was given to 
monitoring and targets and that it was (as of 2003) too early to judge the 
outcomes of the plans. Despite these concerns, the national government 
began to use the annual progress reports to financially reward authorities 
performing well (in terms of delivery and progress against strategy) and 
penalise those that performed badly. 
 
The second round of local transport plans is, as of mid 2005, currently being 
prepared for submission. The guidance issued by the Department for 
Transport requires a focus on a smaller set of nationally consistent indicators 
but also allows local flexibility to set additional targets (DfT, 2004b). Over the 
coming five year period, financial settlements will be adjusted up or down by 
up to 25% according to the quality of the plan (in the first instance) and the 
performance against targets over the plan period (Marsden, 2005). Space 
limitations preclude a more detailed exploration of issues at a local level but 
benefits and difficulties similar to those discussed earlier in respect of national 
targets are apparent. 
 
  
5. Perspectives on the Use of Targets 
 
This section summarises the key arguments for and against the use of targets 
in transport planning. Evidence of both the good and bad aspects of target 
setting have been demonstrated through Section 4. Target setting is not a 
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new process and much can be learned from past experiences to overcome 
the negative aspects observed. 
 
5.1 The case for and against using targets in the public sector  
 
The case in favour 
 
The main arguments for the use of targets in the public sector have already 
been alluded to but can be summarised as follows: 
x Targets provide a clear focus for the work of civil servants, government 
agencies and subsidiary authorities.  
x The use of targets helps to determine funding priorities between and 
within departments. 
x The existence of targets helps to cut through red tape that might 
otherwise hamper progress. 
x Monitoring of targets can provide an early warning of potential 
problems in a given area of policy and will stimulate consideration of 
the need for a change in tactics or additional funding. 
x The achievement of a target sends a signal that a given policy should 
be continued or, in the case of policies designed to accelerate 
achievement, that the policy can now be scaled back.  
x Targets are easily understood by the general public and so help to 
ensure that elected politicians can be judged on their achievements. 
 
The case against 
 
Experience from our research, other government sectors and management 
literature suggest the following potential drawbacks of targets: 
 
x Targets produce an undue concentration of attention and resources on 
a subset of issues which reflect neither the totality of issues that should 
be of concern to government nor a ‘rational’ assessment of priorities. 
Issues which are not the subject of targets then become starved of 
resources (e.g. Thomson and Lally, 2002). Several examples of this 
potential problem have been put forward, many of them from the health 
sector, but it is interesting, in the context of this paper, to note that 
even though the reduction in road casualties might have been 
expected to be accepted as a laudable aim, the adoption of targets for 
casualty reduction was criticised as a distortion of priorities. The 
criticism, by Hillman et al. (1991), was that the interventions designed 
to meet the targets (including extensive pedestrian segregation from 
roadways with barriers and cattle-pen crossings) treated pedestrians 
as inferior citizens and was likely to discourage walking. 
x Targets distort the focus of policy and delivery towards those areas 
where progress can be most easily measured. A focus on easily-
measured outcomes is likely to militate against the adoption of long-
term targets and, as Marsden and Kelly (2005) note, this will be a 
particular problem for transport sustainability targets which, because 
the outcomes require changes in lifestyle, are likely to take a 
considerable time to appear in the data. 
 20
x It is hard to define the right metric against which to measure 
performance. Eccles (1991, p2) notes, “depending on the metric, 
behaviours may be positively targeted towards an area of performance 
weakness but, more negatively, could encourage more myopic 
behaviours to the detriment of performance at the system level”. 
x There is sometimes an insufficient evidence base from which to 
reasonably estimate future performance and this makes target setting 
uncertain (2GC, 2003). 
x Public sector targets tend to be department-specific (or sector-specific) 
even though the underlying issue may involve several sectors. An 
example, noted by the House of Commons (HoC, 2004) is that, 
although the UK Department of Health is responsible for targets 
relating to physical activity (30 minutes of physical activity 5 times a 
week), the actions required to achieve the target probably fall within the 
remit of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport and of the 
Department for Transport. It is difficult for departments to justify extra 
expenditure on policy areas against which their progress is not being 
measured (Zografos et al., 2004). 
x Public sector targets are inevitably political and so may be defined, set, 
interpreted or opposed for reasons of political gamesmanship rather 
than management-efficiency and this may distort their impact. The 
original 10YP target for bus patronage is a case in point. 
 
 
5.2 Alternative approaches to planning 
 
As many countries have not yet moved towards a target-led regime, and given 
the downsides that might exist with management through targets, it is useful 
briefly to review the alternatives before drawing conclusions. 
 
Vision based v. problem solving 
 
A distinction is made in the planning literature (e.g. by Banister, 2002) 
between a vision-based approach, based on the desire to achieve broad 
objectives and an incremental or problem-solving approach, seeking to 
address issues as they arise. In fact the distinction may be less clear cut than 
this because the vision-led approach is often influenced by an appreciation of 
existing problems. An alternative characterisation is between top-down and 
bottom-up approaches because it is the vision of political leaders which tends 
to set the agenda in the one case while it is the experience of problems by 
individual citizens which tends to drive the other. 
 
Targets have a role in both these approaches. They can encapsulate the 
objectives inherent in the vision-based (top-down) approach and can provide 
a means of monitoring the progressive solution of problems in the incremental 
(bottom-up) approach. The nature of the targets will, of course, differ in the 
two cases; the first will tend to employ targets oriented to political aspirations 
while the other will tend to make more use of targets relating to legal or 
contractual obligations. 
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Planning without targets? 
 
Targets have become such a feature of the planning landscape that it is 
sometimes forgotten that they are not implicit in the philosophy of planning. 
The main alternative approach relies on analysis of costs and benefits, 
whether via a formal cost-benefit analysis, a multi-criteria appraisal or a 
planning balance sheet in order to identify the ‘best’ of a series of potential 
interventions. Properly applied, a cost benefit analysis is much more 
sophisticated than reliance on targets; by making use of trade-offs it can 
identify optimum levels of investment and facilitate ‘objective’ comparisons 
between potential investments and can be responsive to changes in costs or 
the valuation of benefits (Powell, 2001).  Understanding the cost of achieving 
a particular outcome is an essential part of determining whether a proposed 
strategy is good value for money and, ultimately whether the marginal benefits 
of public expenditure exceed the costs (McCarthy, 2003). 
 
However, despite its claim to objectivity, the approach is fundamentally 
dependent on the weights put on the various costs and benefits. COBA, the 
Department for Transport’s cost benefit analysis computer program, is one of 
several such programs which has been criticised (e.g. by Banister, 2002) for 
putting undue weight on tangible benefits (e.g. savings in time and reductions 
in accidents) relative to less measurable issues (e.g. environmental quality).  
Although there are ways in which the sensitivity of the results to the weights 
can be explored (see for example, Bonsall et al., 1991) and there are various 
methods of determining consistent weights (Grant-Muller et al., 2001), the 
dependence of the result on largely abstract concepts remains a major 
stumbling block. Another, related, criticism of the cost benefit approach is that 
it too opaque for use in the public arena. It is suggested that while people can 
understand and appreciate targets expressed in terms of outputs and simply-
defined outcomes, they cannot be expected to comprehend an implied target 
to maximise abstract entities such as Benefit/cost Ratios, Net Present Values, 
Consumer Surplus or Social Welfare.   
 
A recent model-based analysis of urban transport policies compared the 
targets and cost-benefit approach to optimizing transport strategies 
(Emberger et al., 2003). It found that whilst the target based approach was 
simpler and more transparent it ignored the cost-effectiveness perspective 
and could de dominated by individual targets. It noted that target regimes, 
although supposed to drive good performance, sometimes produced 
strategies which gave lower value for money and that this was probably due 
to the absence of any feedback on the cost of each outcome. 
 
In fact the best approach is likely to involve the use of cost benefit analysis to 
support the determination of appropriate targets. Because it considers costs 
as well as benefits, this approach is able to identify the point at which 
achievement of a target would not be cost-efficient and this feature could be 
used to avoid adopting and pursuing targets which, although politically 
attractive, could not be achieved without incurring excessive costs. The 
decision to drop the national target for a 50% growth in rail passengers in the 
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UK has partly been taken in recognition of the unaffordable expenditure 
commitment that such a target represents. 
 
Another potential application of cost benefit analysis in conjunction with 
targets is in the determination of the most cost effective allocation of funds 
between different departments of government in the pursuance of a given 
target. For example, to establish whether it would be more effective to pursue 
health targets (e.g. those relating to obesity and heart disease) by 
encouraging walking and cycling than by improving the treatment of the 
symptoms in hospitals.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Targets have been an important feature of the public sector landscape. Their 
traditional manifestation was in the form of political promises to the electorate. 
Against a background of increasing demand for transport, these promises 
were often expressed in terms of increased provision of infrastructure or 
services to meet the expected demand. Political commitments in the transport 
sector typically related to the construction of X miles of new roads or Y new 
runways. As there have always been more schemes than money available to 
fund them, the choice between alternative investments was then made on the 
basis of the relative costs and benefits of the different alternatives. The 
traditional emphasis on promised increases in capacity became increasingly 
untenable as rising demand began to outstrip any conceivable increase in 
capacity. The new policy agenda had to place much more emphasis on the 
management of demand and also of expectations. This change in the policy 
environment, together with society’s increasing emphasis on consumer rights 
and contractual/legal obligations and new perspectives on the role of central 
government and its relationship with lower tiers, has contributed to the UK 
government’s decision to adopt the private sector’s management-by-targets 
approach for most aspects of its activities. The approach was pioneered in the 
health and education sectors but the transport sector, where there was some 
experience of the successful use of targets to drive policy initiatives, was not 
far behind.  
 
This paper has reviewed the experiences, good and not so good, of a series 
of national targets set in the UK between 1986 and 2004. One of the first 
conclusions must be that the “success” of a target should be measured not 
simply in terms of the achievement of the nominated value of the specified 
indicator, but in the light of the progress achieved towards fundamental 
objectives.  
 
Evidence-led targets have greater operational robustness than aspirational 
targets. Evidence-led targets should, where possible, be informed by scenario 
modelling that tests a series of assumptions, positive and negative, about 
exogenous factors and policy impacts. Such an approach does not render the 
decision-maker immune to the sorts of ‘one-off’ changes observed on the UK 
rail network but builds a healthy appreciation of the inevitability of uncertainty 
into the target setting process. 
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When targets have succeeded, as in the case of the road safety targets, they 
have acted as a catalyst and focus for delivery of desired outcomes by all the 
relevant actors. However, some targets have clearly failed to inspire positive 
outcomes. The reasons for this are varied but two key themes have emerged. 
First, sector-specific outcome targets (e.g. separate targets for increases in 
use of cycle, rail, light rail and bus) drive expenditure to achieve these goals 
whether or not it represents good value for money (e.g. attempts to meet the 
rail and light rail targets threatened to deliver particularly poor value for 
money). Second, the metric chosen for the indicator of performance is of 
crucial importance. There is an understandable tendency to concentrate on 
metrics that are already measured even though these metrics may lead to 
unwanted management actions. The difficulties experienced in devising a 
suitable metric for road congestion has damaged the credibility of the target-
setting process in that sector. 
 
One of the manifest benefits of targets is that they focus management 
attention but the corollary is that less management effort and resources will be 
spent on areas where there is no target (as was the case for walking). Such 
concerns become more important if targets relate to the growth of individual 
modes rather than to high-level objectives (efficiency, environment, equity 
etc). Under an objective-led targets framework, the most cost-effective 
solutions can be found at a local level by selecting the most appropriate 
combination of each mode to achieving the desired effect. However, although 
mode-specific, or sector-specific, targets are largely redundant if they are 
simply the means to a higher end, provided they are used with great care they 
may still have a role in drawing attention to the potential contribution by a 
mode or sector that might otherwise be overlooked.  
 
In summary, despite the mixed success of targets as a means to measure 
governmental performance in the UK, there are a series of underlying 
pressures that suggest that they will continue to be important. We conclude 
that a deeper understanding is needed of the management behaviours that 
targets induce in the public sector. Much more could also be done to ensure 
that the targets relate to the key outcomes that need to be achieved rather 
than to those, such as mode use, that are easiest to measure. The use of 
targets is clearly no panacea for government’s dilemma in managing 
expectations but it does give greater transparency to the aims of policy and 
provides clearer identification of conflicts and synergies with other policy 
areas. Set properly, targets are a positive management tool. Set badly, they 
are likely to lead to unintended outcomes and investments that represent poor 
value for money. 
 
References 
 
2GC (2003) Setting Targets for Measures used in Performance Management 
Systems, Management Briefing, www.2gs.co.uk 
 
Atkins (2003) Local transport plans – policy evaluation: Part 1 – Final Report, 
Report to the Department for Transport, London, March 2003. 
 
 24
Banister, D. (2002) Transport Planning, 2nd Ed., SPON Press 0-415-26171-6 
 
Bonsall, P.W., Pearman, A.D. and Cobbett, M. (1991) MASCOT: A Decision 
Support System to Help in the Definition, Development and Ranking of Scheme 
Options.  Proceedings of 19th PTRC Summer Conference, Seminar G, pp 123-
135, PTRC London  
 
Bonsall, PW., Beale, J., Paulley, N. and Pedler, A.  (2005) Evaluating 
priorities and solutions for road travel: the differing perspectives of users and 
service providers, Transport Policy, 12, 4, px-y. 
 
Brown, G. (1998) Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 
Comprehensive Spending Review, 14th July 1998, Hansard col 188-194, 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980714/debtext/80714-05.htm 
 
Cairns, S., Sloman, L., Newson, C., Anable, J., Kirkbride, A. and Goodwin, P. 
(2004) Smarter Choices – Changing the Way We Travel, Report to the 
Department for Transport, July, London. 
 
Carter, N., Klein, R, and Day, P. (1992) How Organisations Measure Success: 
The Use of Performance Indictors in Government, Routledge, London  
 
Commonwealth of Australia (1996) State of Environment Report (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service) 
 
CPRE (2001) Running to stand still: An analysis of the 10 Year Plan for 
Transport, Campaign to Protect Rural England, P. Goodwin, ISBN 1 902786 
35 1 
 
Darling, A. (2005) Road Pricing, Speech to the Social Market Foundation, 
London, 9 June, http://www.dft.gov.uk/  
 
DETR, SE, NAW and DoENI (2000). The Air Quality Strategy for England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, Scottish Executive, The National Assembly for 
Wales and the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland, TSO, 
London, Cm4548 
 
DETR (2000a) Transport 2010: The 10 Year Plan, Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, July 2000. 
 
DETR (2000a) Transport 2010: The Background Analysis, Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, July 2000. 
 
DETR (2000c). Tomorrows Roads: safer for everyone. Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions. The Stationery Office. 
 
DfT (2003a) Autumn Performance Report, Cm6045, London, Department for 
Transport, December. 
 25
 
DfT (2003b) The National Transport Model: Overview, London, Department 
for Transport. 
 
DfT (2004a) The Future of Transport, a network for 2030, Department for 
Transport, London, TSO, Cm6234, July 
 
DfT (2004b) Full guidance on local transport plans second edition, 
Department for Transport, London, released 8 December 
 
DoT (1987) Road safety: The Next Steps.  Interdepartmental review of road 
safety policy.  London, Department of Transport. 
 
DoT (1989) Roads for Prosperity, Cm 693, London, Department of Transport 
 
DoT (1996) National cycling strategy, London, Department of Transport 
 
Eccles, R.G. (1991) The Performance Management Manifesto, Harvard 
Business Review, 131-137 
 
Emberger G., May A.D., Shepherd S.P., and Sumalee, A. (2003), Method to 
Identify Optimal Land Use and Transport Policy Packages, Proc. of the 9th 
TRB Conference on the Application of Transportation Planning Methods, 
Louisiana, USA. 
 
FHWA (2004) Transportation Performance Measures in Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and New Zealand, International Scanning Study Team Report, US 
Federal Highway Administration, http://international.fhwa.dot.gov 
 
Gates, S. (2001) Aligning Strategic Performance Measures and Results, 
Presentation to the Balanced Scorecard Interest Group, February 2001, 
www.conference-board.org 
 
Gilmour, D. and Seagriff, E. (2004) Is benchmarking an effective policy tool? 
A study of four world cities, paper presented at the 2004 European Transport 
Conference, Strasbourg, October, 2004, PTRC London. 
 
Grant-Muller, S., Mackie, P., Nellthorp, J. and Pearman, A. (2001) Economic 
appraisal of European transport projects: the state-of-the-art revisited, 
Transport Reviews, 21(2), p237-61 
 
Hidas, P. and Black, J. (2002) Targets and performance indicators for 
sustainable urban transport: a review of current practice in Sydney, Australia. 
In The Sustainable City II. Urban regeneration and sustainability. Ed. Brebbia, 
C.A., Martin-Duque, J.F. and Wadhwa, L.C. WIT Press, Hampshire 
 
Hillman, M. et al.  (1991) One false move: a study of children's independent 
mobility.  London, Policy Studies Institute. 
 
 26
Hjortdal, H. and Schou, B. (1994) Informing Clients: the Role of Public Service 
Standards Statements, OECD 
 
HM Treasury, Cabinet Office, National Audit Office, Audit Commission, Office 
for National Statistics (2001) Choosing the right FABRIC: A framework for 
performance information, HM Treasury, London. 
 
HoC (2002)10 Year Plan for Transport, Eighth Report of House of Commons 
Transport, Local Government and the Regions Select Committee, Session 
2001-02, HC 558-I, The Stationary Office, London 
 
HoC (2003) On Target? Government by Performance: the Government’s 
Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report, House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2002-03, HC1264, 
The Stationary Office. 
 
HoC (2004) Obesity, Third Report of House of Commons Health Select 
Committee, Session 2003-04, HC 23-I, The Stationary Office, London 
 
Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P. (1992) The Balanced Scorecard – Measures 
that Drive Performance. Harvard Business Review, 71-79 
 
Kelly, C. and Snell, C. (2005) Improved Indicators for Transport Planning: A 
Review, DISTILLATE Project Report C2, University of Leeds, Institute for 
Transport Studies.  
 
Marsden, G. (2004) What role do targets have in transport planning? 
Presentation to 36th Annual Universities’ Transport Study Group Conference, 
5-7 Jan., University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
 
Marsden, G. (2005) U.K. Moves Toward Transportation Funding Based on 
Performance, The Urban Transportation Monitor, 19 (3), 3, February 18th. 
 
Marsden, G. and Bonsall, P. (2004) The Role of Performance Targets in 
Transport Policy, paper presented at the 2004 European Transport 
Conference, Strasbourg, October, 2004, PTRC London. 
 
Marsden, G. and Kelly, C. (2005) Do we count what really counts? paper 
presented at the 3rd UK Transport Practitioners Meeting, Birmingham, July 
2005, PTRC London 
 
Marsden, G. and Wootton, J. (2001) A review of local transport plans in 
England. Proc. of AET European Transport Conference. 10-12 September, 
Homerton College, Cambridge, UK 
 
McCarthy, V. (2003) Performance Measurements and Targets, Internal House 
of Commons seminar, Scrutiny Unit, London. 
 
 27
NAO (2001) Measuring the Performance of Government Departments, 
National Audit Office, HC 301, Session 2000-2001, The Stationary Office. 
 
NCHRP (2004) Strategic Planning and Decision Making in State Departments 
of Transportation: A Synthesis of Highway Practice, National Cooperative 
Highway Research Program Synthesis 326, Transportation Research Board, 
Washington D.C. 
 
Powell, T. (2001) The Principles of Transport Economics, PTRC, 0-86050-
337-2 
 
PTEG (2002) Inquiry into rail services in the North of England, Evidence 
submitted to the Transport, Local Government and the Regions Select 
Committee, June 2002. 
 
SMA (1995) The Public Service Quality Charter, SMA, Portugal. 
 
Thomson, R.G. and Lally, J. (2000) Performance management at the 
crossroads in the NHS: don't go into the red, Quality in Health Care, 9, 201-
202 
 
Turner, D., Dix, M., Gardner, K. and Beevers, S. (1999) Setting traffic 
reduction targets for London, Traffic Engineering and Control, 40 (4), 186-94 
 
Zografos, K.G., May, A.D., Marsden, G., Kallioinen, J. and Tegner, H. (2004) 
Survey of transport institutional issues in Europe, Deliverable 3, Transport 
Institutions in the Policy Process, DG TREN (www.strafica.fi\tipp) 
  
 28
